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1. Exile and ideas of civic virtue: two second-century BC examples 
The theme of exile often provoked Greek thinkers and citizens to reflect about the 
foundations of politics, citizenship and civic virtue. A concise example is an 
inscription from Delphi, dating to c. 120–115 BC. This inscription records a decree of 
the Delphic Amphictyony, the federal body in charge of the whole Delphic sanctuary, 
in honour of some citizens of Delphi who had been forced into exile after making 
allegations of corruption against sanctuary magistrates. The decree includes abstract 
reflections about the ethical qualities of the exiles: 
 
...καὶ ἐπιβουλευθέντες καὶ ἐκπεσόντες ἐκ τῆ[ς πατ]ρίδος, οὐκ 
ἀπέστησαν τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντος καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ 
προστάσεως, [κατ]α[φυγό]ντες δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκλητον τὴν 
Ῥωμαίων, καὶ οὐ προϊδόμενοι οὔτε κίνδυνον οὔτε κακοπα[θίαν 
οὔ]τε δαπάνην.... 
 
... and having been plotted against and forced into exile from their homeland, 
they did not defect from the just and fine and the supervision of the sanctuary, 
but, having fled for refuge to the Roman Senate, and not having had any 
concern about danger or hardship or expense....1  
                                                          
1 CID 4.118, ll. 6–9; the main verb of the ‘but’ clause is unknown, because the inscription breaks off 




This decree offers an unusually direct and arresting insight into everyday Greek 
assumptions and ideas about citizenship, of the kind to which speakers could appeal in 
the public forum of a political assembly, like the one which endorsed this decree. This 
is because the authors of the decree, like many other Greek writers about exile, 
explicitly reflected about the questions of political legitimacy and morality raised by 
exiles’ predicament. In particular, in the extract given here, they sought to identify the 
basic, abstract, ethical components of citizenship to which virtuous citizens could 
cling even when in exile, removed from the physical environment and normal social 
relations of their polis. These individuals, though exiled from their home polis, had 
not ‘defected from the just and fine and the supervision of the sanctuary’, but spared 
no effort in going to the Roman Senate, presumably to campaign for what they 
perceived as the welfare of the sanctuary. The predicament of these exiles thus 
provoked a particularly explicit comment on the importance of commitment to justice, 
the common good and common traditions at all costs: the inalienable kernel of good 
citizenship is to show very strong civic virtue, which has a crucial religious 
component. That virtue often demands, as in this case, considerable self-sacrifice. 
 
This inscription can be compared and contrasted with another example of second-
century BC rhetoric concerning exiles, this time from a literary work. In the mid-
second century, the historian Polybius, himself a type of exile, a citizen of 
Peloponnesian Megalopolis who had been taken as a hostage to Rome, reflected in his 
Histories on the ethical qualities of a group of earlier exiles from Megalopolis. He 
criticised the earlier historian Phylarchus for failing to record the most praiseworthy 
aspects of the behaviour of the Megalopolitans when they were expelled en masse 
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from their polis in 223 BC by Cleomenes III of Sparta. Assembled in exile in 
neighbouring Messene, the Megalopolitan refugees collectively refused an offer from 
Cleomenes of a return to their home polis in exchange for alliance with him, 
preferring to remain loyal to their longstanding allies, their fellow members of the 
Achaian League:      
  
οἳ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν χώραν Κλεομένει προεῖντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν 
ὁλοσχερῶς ἔπταισαν τῇ πατρίδι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς αἵρεσιν, 
τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, δοθείσης ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως αὐτοῖς 
ἐξουσίας ἀβλαβῆ ταύτην ἀπολαβεῖν, προείλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας, 
τάφων, ἱερῶν, πατρίδος, τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἁπάντων συλλήβδην τῶν 
ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαιοτάτων χάριν τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς 
τοὺς συμμάχους πίστιν. οὗ τί κάλλιον ἔργον ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γένοιτ' ἄν; 
... διὰ τίνος δ' ἔργου μᾶλλον ἂν παρορμήσαι πρὸς φυλακὴν πίστεως 
καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαίων κοινωνίαν; 
 
They first gave their territory up to Cleomenes, and after this they completely 
lost their homeland as a result of their policy towards the Achaians. Finally, 
when, beyond their hopes and unexpectedly, they gained an opportunity to take 
their homeland back unharmed, they chose to be deprived of their territory, 
graves, sanctuaries, homeland and property, in sum, of all the most necessary 
things among men, for the sake of not betraying their good faith towards their 
allies. What finer act than this has happened or could happen? ... Through what 
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other action could an author better urge his audience towards the maintaining 
of good faith and the sharing of true and firm business?2 
 
In its eulogistic rhetoric, this extract from Polybius closely resembles a Hellenistic 
honorary decree, like that of the Amphictyony. It is thus an important initial 
indication of a phenomenon explored throughout this book: the permeability of the 
boundary between the vocabulary, style and concerns of public political rhetoric 
recorded in epigraphic form and the rhetoric of contemporary literary authors, 
especially historians, orators and philosophers. 
 
Moreover, Polybius uses precisely the same rhetorical topos as the authors of the 
decree from Delphi: he uses military and diplomatic language (προδοῦναι, 
φυλακή) in claiming that, though physically removed from their home city, the 
Megalopolitans preserved the most important abstract components of virtue. 
However, he stresses a different type of virtue: the Megalopolitan refugees set greatest 
store by ‘not betraying’ (τὸ μὴ προδοῦναι) their good faith towards allies. This was 
an example of the ‘guarding’ of good faith (φυλακὴ πίστεως), the quality involved 
in respecting agreements and contracts. Paradoxically, in Polybius’ view, the 
Megalopolitans could in this case be better citizens, of both Megalopolis and the 
Achaian League, by remaining in exile, rather than returning to their physical polis. 
Polybius even explicitly praises the fact that the Megalopolitans chose good faith 
towards their allies over recovering their territory, graves, sanctuaries, homeland and 
property. There is thus a pronounced contrast with the Delphic example: whereas the 
authors of the Amphictyonic decree made self-sacrificing concern for the local 
                                                          
2 Polybius 2.61.9–11. 
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sanctuary, exemplified in perilous diplomacy on its behalf, central to virtue, Polybius 
gave overriding importance to the sanctity of contracts and agreements. In his view, 
the requirements of contractual good faith could legitimately oblige citizens even to 
abandon their home sanctuaries to be sacked by their greatest enemies. 
 
2. The subject and argument of the book 
Expulsion from their cities was a perennial risk for citizens of Greek poleis, from the 
Archaic period to Late Antiquity. This could occur in many different ways, of 
different frequencies in different periods. Citizens could be sentenced to formal exile 
by a court; forced to flee their city, like the Delphian exiles considered in the previous 
section, to avoid condemnation by a court or political persecution; driven out during 
civil war (the most violent type of stasis or ‘civil strife’); or expelled from their city 
by an external invader, like the Megalopolitan refugees praised by Polybius. In each 
case, exile3 entailed loss of security and status, devastating for those affected. One 
indication of this is that philosophers of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods wrote 
consolatory tracts, a genre otherwise principally concerned with poverty and 
bereavement, addressed to exiles.4 
 
One purpose of this book is to provide a new history of Greek exile in the later 
Classical and Hellenistic periods, and its causes and consequences. However, the 
principal aim is to explore the phenomenon evident in the previous section: the way in 
                                                          
3 ‘Exile’ will be understood to refer to the multiple processes caused by human action through which 
Greek citizens were forced to emigrate from, or prevented from returning to, their homeland or 
preferred residence, without the original expelling power equipping them with a new place of residence 
or enslaving them. 
4 Cf. Giesecke (1891); more recently Garland (2014), 26-9. Teles On Exile is the only (partially) 
surviving example from this period, but Plutarch’s contribution to this genre drew on a rich fourth-
century and Hellenistic tradition.  
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which experience or discussion of exile provoked fundamental political reflection or 
exposed fundamental political assumptions.5  
 
Accordingly, the book uses exile to probe the character, development and influence in 
this period of Greek poleis’ political cultures: the basic shared political ideas, 
assumptions and ambiguities in circulation within individual poleis, within regional 
groups of poleis and within the Greek world as a whole. It also examines aspects of 
the more developed political thought which ancient Greeks built upon the foundations 
provided by those political cultures, using the resources of those political cultures 
themselves. To make this project as effective and revealing as possible, the scope of 
the political activities and debates relevant to exile is very broadly interpreted. 
Attention is given to the whole range of processes of civic unrest and stabilisation 
resulting in, or caused by, the exiling of citizens from their cities. 
 
The book also interprets broadly the range of evidence relevant to reconstructing 
Greek political thinking. The book addresses not only literary and philosophical texts, 
of types commonly used for this purpose, but also epigraphic texts concerning exile. 
The latter are often ostensibly routine and administrative, but nonetheless, like the 
Delphic Amphictyonic decree discussed in the previous section, richly revealing of 
underlying abstract political ideas and assumptions. Moreover, with the aid of the 
epigraphic evidence, this book analyses political and legal institutions and their 
accompanying practices and terminology6 as evidence for political assumptions and 
ideas, treating the design and running of such institutions as themselves forms of 
implicit ‘political thinking’. 
                                                          
5 Compare the approach of Forsdyke (2005) to the Archaic and Classical periods. 





Taking into account political thinking, speaking, acting and organising at many 
different levels in these ways makes possible a much richer and more complex picture 
of the range of ancient Greek ideas about what a polis could and should be, and their 
interconnections.7 The argument of this book is that applying this method reveals the 
particular importance in Greek civic political culture of contrasting, interlocking basic 
approaches to politics similar to those evident in the rhetoric about exile of the 
Delphic inscription and the Polybius extract: strong ideals of virtue, patriotism and 
community coexisted with strict ideals of good faith, like-for-like exchange and 
punctilious respect for rules and contracts. The influence and interaction of these two 
approaches, including the tensions between them, exerted a very significant influence 
on the course of Greek politics. 
 
This introduction seeks to lay the foundations for making this argument effectively. 
The next section explains the reasoning behind the book’s geographical and 
chronological scope. Section 4 defends in more detail the notion of political culture 
central to the book. It also sets out explicitly the method of studying political culture 
followed here. This section is necessarily written at a much more abstract and 
theoretical level than the rest of the book, since it deals with fundamental questions 
about the nature of political thinking and action within a political community. The 
account is, however, kept as concise and straightforward as possible. Section 5 then 
explains further why different phenomena involving exile offer particularly useful 
tools for interpreting Greek political culture. The next step, in section 6, is to 
introduce leading scholarly interpretations of Greek civic political culture and this 
                                                          
7 For earlier works which integrate epigraphic and literary evidence as evidence for political ideas, see, 
for example, Bertrand (1999); Liddel (2007). 
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book’s relationship to them, which involves defining some of the basic political ideals 
central to the argument. 
 
3. Geographical and chronological scope 
This book examines evidence from throughout the Greek world. The chronological 
period addressed is the ‘long fourth century’,8 c. 404–146, from the end of the 
Peloponnesian War to the Roman conquest of the Greek world. There was probably 
no great change in the role of exile in the Greek world in c. 404. The other 
chronological limit does, however, mark a significant shift: Roman regulation 
gradually came to curtail the Greek exile phenomenon substantially, without bringing 
it to an end.9 Similarly, while increased direct Roman involvement after c. 146 caused 
many significant changes in poleis’ political cultures, there was much more limited 
change in the character of poleis’ political cultures around 404.  
 
Despite these considerations, the period c. 404–146 is suitable for separate study, 
because the nature, quality and spread of the evidence enable more detailed and wide-
ranging consideration of prominent basic political assumptions than is possible for 
earlier periods of Greek history. This is partly due to the emergence of utopian 
political writing in prose.10 It is also because a new, less circumscribed rationalism,11 
connected with the full embrace of literacy as a political technology,12 led to many 
explicit, relatively unequivocal statements by non-philosopher citizens of basic 
political assumptions, in the preserved rhetoric of speeches and inscribed decrees.  
 
                                                          
8 Cf. Ma (2000).  
9 Seibert (1979), 218–19. 
10 Gadamer (1983); Hornblower (2011), 192–5. 
11 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1973), ch. 1. 
12 Murray (1990c), 11. 
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4. The concept of political culture 
4.1. The nature of political culture 
The notion of political culture is a useful tool for responding to a specific problem 
faced by the historian of Greek political thinking and events. Citizens of a Greek 
polis, like members of any other political community, both did and did not possess a 
shared political consciousness. On the one hand, Greek citizens were inescapably 
deeply influenced in their thinking, attitudes and emotions by the particular political 
milieux to which they were exposed. On the other hand, those same citizens could 
also exercise significant political agency. They did so to different degrees, but often in 
ways which could not be predicted even with exhaustive knowledge of the milieux 
which influenced them. The challenge is to find a theory of political thought and 
action which simultaneously gives adequate weight to both of these aspects of 
politics.13 
 
Study of Plato’s political thought is a case in point. It is necessary to find a way of 
interpreting and explaining Plato’s revolutionary political thought as that of an 
Athenian citizen, keenly aware of wider Greek civic practices, expectations and 
problems.14 Plato’s political ideas, or, at least, the political ideas with which he made 
sympathetic characters experiment, were clearly shaped by prevalent Classical Greek 
political assumptions.15 In particular, they bear the imprint of Plato’s upbringing, in 
and around the Athenian urban deme of Kollytos, and his exposure to Classical 
Athenian politics. The broader culture of Classical Athens also exerted an influence: 
                                                          
13 For the general problem, compare Habermas (1990a), 102, 199–200; Hurley (1990), ch. 15, esp. 
317–18; Frazer and Lacey (1993), 198–201, 203. 
14 See Monoson (2000); Schofield (2006), chs. 2–3. For a recent picture of Plato as a more autonomous 
cultural critic, less rooted in existing frameworks, see Allen (2010), chs. 2–4. 




for example, the centrality in Athenian civic life of the symposium and its cultural 
products, including vase-painting and lyric poetry, can be seen as a provocation for 
the comments on art and imitation in Book X of the Republic.16 Apparently 
paradoxically, even the vigorous attacks on the Athenian democracy which feature in 
Plato’s works were couched in terms very familiar from democratic culture. As 
Monoson has emphasised, Plato drew on Athenian democratic expectations and 
practices of free or frank speech, as well as on Athenian democratic interest in the 
connections between politics and theatre.17 
 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to account for all the ideas and rhetoric pursued in 
Plato’s works as results of him unwittingly reproducing, or explicitly engaging with, 
the ideas and debates of his time and place. On the contrary, Plato set out through the 
voices of his characters a radical, groundbreaking political philosophy, incorporating 
original and penetrating criticisms of democracy, which could certainly not be 
predicted simply by analysing the many strands of contemporary political thinking 
and their interconnections.18  
 
To take another example, this time involving someone who was not a philosopher, the 
notion of political culture is also a useful response to the problems raised by the task 
of describing and explaining the political career of Polemaios, a prominent later-
second-century citizen of Colophon in Asia Minor, well-known from one of the most 
famous Hellenistic civic inscriptions. As that Colophonian honorary decree19 makes 
                                                          
16 Burnyeat (1999). 
17 See Monoson (2000). This aspect of Monoson’s analysis can stand independently of her more 
controversial suggestions that Plato was to some degree himself a democratic sympathiser. 
18 On the need to account for simultaneous cultural embeddedness and free-thinking criticism in 
interpreting classic works of political thought: Skinner (2002), esp. ch. 4. 
19 Robert and Robert (1989), Polemaios text, pp. 11–17; SEG 39.1243. 
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clear, Polemaios had been comprehensively habituated in such a way that he had an 
instinctive commitment to the ideals of Colophonian and Greek culture. In addition to 
his experience of the political assemblies, festivals and other celebrations of Colophon 
itself, he was educated in the intellectual centre of Rhodes. He also acted upon those 
ideals, conducting himself as a stereotypical Greek civic benefactor. Like Plato before 
him, he must have engaged with the basic political assumptions of the majority of 
fellow citizens, including those of his political opponents and of citizens from quite 
different socio-economic backgrounds. He could not otherwise have succeeded in 
gaining and retaining the support of the Colophonian citizen assembly for his policies 
and honours. On the other hand, even though he must have been firmly rooted in his 
particular political milieux and was nowhere near as independent-minded as Plato, 
Polemaios was able to rise to the challenge of innovating significantly in his political 
methods: he conducted a new type of diplomacy in his interactions with the Roman 
Senate, showing sufficient political flexibility to establish Colophonian relations with 
Rome on a favourable footing.      
 
A promising response to these practical problems is to suppose that any coherent 
political group has a shared political culture of a particular, complex kind, whether or 
not its members live together. That political culture consists of the fundamental, non-
partisan political ideas in circulation which are consensually accepted by members as 
valid foundations for political claims. This is the common stock of political notions 
maintained and used by all, which does not belong to any particular individual or 
section of the group. Not all or even most such ideas become transparent to many or 
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any of the group’s members: many remain at the level of unconscious assumptions 
about politics, taken for granted but unexpressed.20 
 
The ‘fundamental’ ideas which make up any political culture include very varied 
conceptions, paradigms and norms. They include conceptions of the essential nature 
of community and the individual; of political community and political membership; of 
the particular political group involved and its members; of valid sources of political 
legitimacy, secular and religious, especially law; and of the relationships between 
those things. For example, the political cultures of the Greek civic world included, to 
consider only conceptions of discrete concepts identifiable with a single word, 
varying conceptions of ‘virtue’ (ἀρετή), ‘justice’ (δικαιοσύνη), ‘friendship’ 
(φιλία), ‘flourishing’ (εὐδαιμονία), ‘freedom’ (ἐλευθερία), ‘equality before the 
law’ or ‘the rule of law’ (ἰσονομία) and ‘piety’ (εὐσέβεια), among many other 
things. 
 
Closely related to such conceptions are fundamental paradigms21 of political 
organisation and behaviour: models of how a polis or citizen should be organised and 
behave. In the ancient Greek world, for example, a widespread, quite constant 
paradigm was that of the polis as a simultaneously political and religious community, 
whose political and religious aspects are inextricably intertwined.22 From such 
paradigms derive fundamental political norms: implicit rules concerning citizens’ 
political behaviour, in political contexts in general or in specific situations. The 
widespread Greek paradigm of the polis as a political and religious community 
                                                          
20 Compare Taylor (1995), ch. 9; Freeden (1996), e.g. 21, 34–5, 101–104; Schmidt (2008), 308. This is, 
of course, only one among many possible ways of understanding political culture: see Welch (1993). 
21 Cf. Burke (1986), 445–7. 
22 Cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (1990). 
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commonly entailed, for example, norms requiring participation in civic festivals, as a 
central citizen duty.23 
 
The fundamental ideas of a political culture are the collective products of ongoing 
dialogue among members of the group concerned, which builds on and develops the 
collective self-understanding of their predecessors as members.24 Those collective 
products are dispersed throughout the minds of individual members, and throughout 
their communication with one another. In addition, they are in circulation in the group 
in that they are encoded in the full range of collective institutions, traditions, stories, 
symbols and practices. Many of these are cultural and religious rather than narrowly 
political. 25 They are also embedded in the often material products of those parts of 
collective life. In Greek poleis, those products included, for example, inscriptions, 
coins or monuments, but also, less obviously, the poetry and art associated with civic 
festivals. 
 
Understood in this way, political culture can explain why Greek citizens, like other 
political agents, always remained mentally embedded in one or multiple political 
milieux, even when physically uprooted (compare chapter 6 below). First, it is 
necessary for anyone to remain mentally embedded in at least one political culture in 
order to develop and sustain any political identity and understanding whatsoever. This 
is because the fundamental shared ideas which make up a political culture represent 
some of the indispensable basic points of orientation which enable individuals to 
                                                          
23 Note, for example, Goldhill (1987); Parker (2005). 
24 Compare Schmidt (2008), esp. 309–321. 
25 Some would plausibly argue that all these media for preserving, disseminating and adapting 
fundamental political ideas should themselves be regarded as part of political culture: for example, that 
the legend of Harmodios and Aristogeiton was itself part of Classical Athenian political culture. 
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understand themselves and their world,26 even if they have only a very partial or hazy 
grip on them.27 Individuals need this general type of understanding as acutely as 
material goods and the power and knowledge required to obtain them.28 Moreover, for 
such understanding to be satisfying, it cannot be a simple translation of material 
interests into ideas and values. The constituent ideas of a political culture can provide 
a useful framework for such understanding of the world because they are shared by 
many individuals and expressed in institutions, and have often been subject to 
selective social processes of critique29 or tailoring to the broad needs of the group and 
its members. Consequently, they have the authoritative, comparatively stable 
character required to serve as reliable basic points of orientation. For both Plato and 
Polemaios, for example, the notion of a polis, widely conceived as a participatory, 
organised group of citizens, must have provided a crucial initial foothold in 
developing an understanding of their political environment and their place in it. It 
provided an irrevocable framework which shaped their subsequent political behaviour 
and thinking. 
 
Second, it is necessary to remain mentally embedded in at least one political culture in 
order to be able to participate at all in meaningful political communication with 
others, which must draw on shared basic points of reference. Shared basic concepts 
and ideas are required to make possible even political disagreement, let alone 
                                                          
26 On the indispensable role of culture and environment in providing such points of orientation, see 
Habermas (1987), chs. V–VI, esp. 120-6 (describing Habermas’ conception of the ‘lifeworld’ of a 
society); also Habermas (1972), 53; (1990a), 67–8, 102, 199. Note also Taylor (1989), esp. 35–40; 
compare Sandel (1982); Walzer (1983). For the general approach, see also Freeden (1996), e.g. 51. 
27 Compare Plato Phaedrus 249b3–c4: in order to serve as a human soul, as opposed to an 
animal’s, a soul must have had at least some experience of the really existing, perfect Forms. 
Even rudimentary human thought or communication requires at least hazy acquaintance with, 
or memory of, sophisticated paradigms. The paradigms of a political culture are, however, 
very different from Platonic Forms: they are mutable social constructs.  
28 Cf. Habermas (1972), esp. chs. 2–3. 
29 Cf. Habermas (1987), 124–6. 
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consensus.30 To return to the specific example of Plato, both he and many staunch 
Athenian democrats were convinced of the need to identify solid ethical foundations 
for political life, and to protect them against opportunists and relativists. It was 
probably partly that shared conviction which made it possible for them to participate 
in vigorous exchanges about the nature of those foundations, and of the identity of the 
main relativistic threat to them: democracy, for Plato,31 or Socratic philosophy, for his 
opponents. Arena has recently made a similar case about the nature of Roman politics 
in the late Roman Republic, arguing that the Roman elite and its critics were able to 
debate strenuously the nature of libertas because they collaborated in maintaining a 
shared framework of language and debate. That shared framework was based on a 
consensual notion of libertas as freedom from even the possibility of arbitrary 
domination by another, which could be applied in contrasting egalitarian and anti-
egalitarian ways.32 
 
On account of these two broad points, the traditional view that the elements of a 
group’s political culture are comparatively stable, though mutable through long-term 
processes of reflection and dialogue, is probably preferable to a major modern 
alternative: the view that a group’s political culture should be viewed as a radically 
mutable process or ‘discourse’, in which fluid shared concepts and rules are 
repeatedly constructed afresh.33 The theory advocated here does, however, need to 
address some of the concerns motivating this alternative approach. 
                                                          
30 Taylor (1985), 36–7. Taylor advocates the view that the shared political consciousness of a group 
consists of ‘intersubjective meanings’, in opposition (cf. Taylor (1985), 31–2) to the view of Almond 
and Verba, the political scientists who first attempted to make the notion of political culture useful for 
empirical political-scientific research, that a group’s political culture is a composite of the subjective 
basic political attitudes of its members (cf. Almond and Verba (1963), 12–14, 16). 
31 See especially Plato Gorgias, e.g. 464b2–466a3. 
32 Arena (2012), 8, 11–13, 30–1, 44, 78–9, 200, 256–7, 265–6.   
33 For a historiographical example of this alternative approach, see the works on the French Revolution 




An immediate important objection to the picture offered here of strong mental 
embedding of individuals in political cultures might be that it presupposes that 
political communities are far more insular and simple than is usually the case. 
However, according to this theory, a group sharing a political culture need not be a 
stable or closed one. There may be frequent changes in membership, including 
through exile and migration (compare chapter 6 below). New members can then bring 
new assumptions and approaches, reinforcing other external influences. Those 
newcomers may even, through long, difficult processes, shed their earlier political 
cultures, or combine some or all of them with this new one: individuals are certainly 
not trapped in one political culture. 
 
Moreover, a political culture is often itself internally dynamic. Indeed, as well as 
being able to explain the strong embeddedness of Greek citizens in particular political 
milieux, the conception of political culture followed here can also explain how Greek 
citizens such as Plato or Polemaios were nonetheless able to exercise substantial, 
unpredictable personal agency in their political thinking. The fundamental shared 
ideas of their political cultures provided starting-points and building-blocks of kinds 
which are, in fact, necessary for independent political reflection and decision-
making.34 
                                                                                                                                                                      
historical explanation of studying practices, media and a particular notion of discourse, as opposed to 
‘mentalities’ and representations; consider Chartier (1988), esp. 13–14, 36–7; 40; (1991), 6–7, 15–17, 
42. The approach followed here is not, however, incompatible with less radical approaches to politics 
as discourse, which treat discourse as wide-ranging communication concerning ideas which are 
mutable but also durable: see, for example, Schmidt (2008), 309–313; compare the views analysed and 
partially endorsed in Welch (1993), chs. 6–7, esp. 111–17; 147–58. 
34 Compare Brock (2013), xii, on the mutable ‘underlying ideological landscape’ of Greek politics. 
Also recently on ancient Greece, compare Johnstone (2011), 6 (different socially constructed ‘logics’ 
and associated practices both enable and restrict individual agency) or van Nijf and Alston (2011a) (on 




The internal range of even a single political culture is usually sufficiently wide to 
enable and encourage the extent of individual agency which makes possible both 
substantial conflict between members of the group sharing that political culture and 
substantial change in political ideas, even in the absence of strong influence from 
outside.35 This is precisely because a group’s political culture comprises all 
fundamental political ideas in circulation within it which are consensually accepted as 
valid bases for political claims. The ideas under this broad umbrella are very unlikely 
to form a unified whole, even if membership of the group is relatively closed and 
constant. More probably, the group’s political culture will be a dynamic composite of 
varied, or even contradictory, basic ways of thinking about politics. In many cases, it 
will also be the case that significant ideas are ambiguous and indeterminate.36 It is 
possible to point, for example, to the very varied, ambiguous basic ways of thinking 
about the foundational act of voting which are widely shared, at least unconsciously, 
by democratic citizens, no matter what policies or parties they tend to vote for. Should 
good citizens vote for the common good or each for their perceived self-interest? 
Should they treat voting as a political ritual of unity, or rather as an opportunity to 
display independence? 
 
With all their variety and ambiguities, political cultures commonly not only enable, 
but also encourage, independent thought, often including reactions against widely 
                                                                                                                                                                      
a conception of political culture as ‘the values, expectations and implicit rules that expressed and 
shaped collective intentions and actions’ (van Nijf and Alston (2011b), 11). 
35 For the difficulty of accounting for these social phenomena within a traditional ‘mentalities’ 
approach: Burke (1986), 443–4, 447. 
36 Cf. Ober (2003a), 237–8. Freeden (1996), 55–60, goes so far as to classify political concepts as 
‘essentially contested concepts’ (compare his 60–7: political concepts as ‘cluster concepts’, with an 
‘ineliminable core’ but an indeterminate, contested ‘circumference’). 
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accepted principles.37 Contradictions and indeterminacies in basic shared assumptions 
can provoke a Socrates or a Plato to attempt to develop coherent, innovative 
philosophical syntheses of ideas about the good city and soul. For example, the city-
soul analogy of Plato’s Republic develops in a groundbreaking, provocative way the 
common Greek assumption that a polis is in some way analogous to an individual 
person or body.38 In a less extreme version of this process, contradictions or 
indeterminacies within prevailing ideas about the nature of patriotism, and the status 
of the outside world, could lead a more conventional Greek, like Polemaios or 
Polybius, to reflect carefully about a particular choice of foreign policy, in a way 
which yielded an independent perspective (compare chapter 5 below). 
 
Substantial conflict is possible when different individuals and groups seize on ideas 
with incompatible practical implications, or advocate contrasting interpretations of a 
single indeterminate idea. Similarly, substantial change occurs when individuals or 
groups interpret or combine ideas in new ways, for example by conceiving a synthesis 
of contradictory ideas in a new idea.39 The phenomenon of divergent or even clashing 
applications of shared basic conceptions of good citizenship is evident in contrasting 
Roman republican interpretations of a shared notion of libertas, or in the two 
examples with which this introduction began. Polybius and the authors of the decree 
of the Delphic Amphictyony were each equally influenced by the metaphor of the 
good citizen’s loyalty to certain abstract principles, which he can preserve regardless 
of his physical location and circumstances. However, they applied that metaphor to 
exiles’ relationships with quite different types of fundamental political obligation, 
                                                          
37 Compare Freeden (1996), 115–16. 
38 Compare Brock (2013), 74–6. 
39 ‘Friction’ between basic shared political assumptions as drivers of change and innovation: Lieberman 
(2002), 702–3; Schmidt (2008), 314–17, 320.  
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themselves drawn from the very broad repertoire of types of political virtue available 
within Greek civic political culture. 
 
In addition to underpinning other mental constructions, including political 
philosophies, the fundamental ideas of political cultures provide the necessary 
starting-points and building-blocks for the thought and communication required to 
construct interlocking sets of ideas which are more complex, explicit and specific to 
particular political questions than the components of a political culture:40 for example, 
different detailed ancient Greek ideas of democratic or aristocratic order, or modern 
conservative or liberal visions of society. Such more developed sets of practical ideas 
can be described as ideologies.41 As Freeden argues, individuals and groups develop 
ideological positions by interpreting, and giving more precise meaning to, the 
indeterminate, open-ended political concepts of their conceptual world. The resulting 
ideologies can themselves be open-ended and mutable, more like a developing, porous 
language than a fixed canon of principles.42 Indeed, unlike necessarily rigorous 
political philosophies, ideologies can involve varying degrees of intellectual content 
and supporting argument.43 
 
Unlike the fundamental ideas which make up a group’s political culture, an ideology 
is almost always shaped by its adherents’ social position and particular experiences. 
Moreover, an ideology often gives priority to the partisan interests of a particular 
group within the broader political community. There is, therefore, strong reason for 
                                                          
40 Cf. Welch (1993), 108. 
41 Alternatively, they could be characterised as ‘programmatic beliefs’, constructed upon a foundation 
of basic ‘public philosophies’ and issuing in more specific and pragmatic ‘policy ideas’: Schmidt 
(2008), 306–307. 
42 See Freeden (1996), esp. 14, 39–40, 75–91. 
43 Compare the concept of ‘intellectual traditions’, intermediate between ideologies and philosophies, 
which Arena (2012), 6–8, 78–9, advocates as an alternative to ‘ideologies’. 
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bearing in mind the Marxist notion of ideology as an important basis of class power.44 
However, it is not a necessary feature of an ideology that it should be partisan and 
power-oriented in this way: there can be complex, explicit and specific sets of 
political notions which are not of this kind.45 On the other hand, very few developed 
ideologies command wide-ranging consensus within any political group. This is the 
main reason for not including ideologies themselves among the constituents of 
political culture, something necessarily shared and non-partisan. 
 
Modern attempts, similar to this one, to mark out within the conceptual worlds of 
political communities a sphere of political culture, containing ideas and assumptions 
which are non-partisan and consensually accepted as valid foundations for political 
claims, have been strongly criticised. A major objection has been that all political 
ideas and norms are in some way oriented towards the assertion or preservation of the 
power of a partisan group, or even ideological in the Marxist sense.46 Many taken-for-
granted assumptions and more developed ideas can be described in that way,47 but 
even those assumptions and ideas are often interwoven with non-partisan 
presuppositions. Indeed, individuals commonly succeed in inducing peers to accept 
their partisan ideological claims or assumptions only because they successfully 
manipulate non-partisan, consensual standards: their audience accepts their claims 
because they appear consistent with fundamental collective objectives. 
 
                                                          
44 For discussion and criticism of the Marxist approach to ideology, see Rosen (1996). 
45 Compare Freeden (1996), 22–3: ideologies are always connected with political power, but not 
necessarily with exploitative political power.  
46 Cf. Pateman (1980).  
47 Compare Bourdieu’s emphasis on taken-for-granted assumptions (the constituents of doxa) which are 
themselves strongly implicated in struggles for ‘symbolic domination’; see, for example, Bourdieu 
(1990), 67–8; (1991), e.g. 50–2. 
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Consider, for example, Foucault’s argument that the laws and institutions of the 
modern state should be seen principally as products of a political elite’s rapacious 
pursuit of power. Habermas criticises this argument on the grounds that those in 
power rely on consensually accepted, communally beneficial norms to formulate and 
successfully advocate even their own partisan projects. For instance, the institutions 
and norms of bureaucratic, impersonal administration and surveillance which 
arguably sometimes form a basis for intrusive state control of national populations 
often, in fact, overlap substantially with the very institutions and norms consensually 
accepted as necessary for the effective and equitable functioning of a communally 
beneficial welfare state.48 As the modern French historian Rosanvallon puts the 
general point, also reacting against some of Foucault’s ideas, politics must be seen as 
a sphere, not simply of power and domination, but also of experimentation and 
exploration concerning shared values and problems.49 
 
According to this approach, followed here, ideological manipulation and rhetorical 
power plays are always parasitical on the conceptual and linguistic products of the 
cooperative pursuit of collective self-understanding: for effective oppression, 
oppressors and oppressed must share a common ethical and political language. 
Accordingly, it is wrong to see (for example) Liddell and Scott’s Greek lexicon as a 
catalogue only of partisan words and ideas, weapons in power politics and class 
struggle. Any dictionary also records ideas which have been painstakingly developed 
by the members of political and cultural groups over long periods, through very 
complex and lengthy processes of collective reflection and pursuit of mutual 
understanding. These are neutral, consensual, often open-ended points of orientation, 
                                                          
48 Habermas (1990b), 286–91. 
49 Rosanvallon (2006), 74–5. 
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and foundations for claims in social and political life. According to the approach 
followed in this book, it is of such ideas that a political culture is composed. 
 
4.2. The relationship between political culture and political action  
Political culture contributes to causing political action by helping to shape 
individuals’ intentions and motives. Fundamental political ideas are most obviously 
relevant to explaining cases in which agents deliberate carefully before acting, 
especially when they deliberate about the ethical and political status of their action. 
However, they are also relevant in the case of more unconsidered or even impulsive 
action: they shape the agent’s instincts and horizons, which are always in the 
background even of swift, situational decision-making.50 
 
The influence of one or more political cultures, combined with individual agency, 
obviously cannot offer a full account of political action. Socio-economic structures 
(class, status) and institutions, and individuals’ interests within them, exert their own 
constraints. The discussion in the previous section entails, however, that the influence 
of those factors is not entirely distinct from that of political culture. Rather, the ideas 
which constitute political cultures themselves underpin social organisation and 
institutions: they enable agents to participate in the creation and perpetuation of social 
relationships, hierarchies and institutions51 and to recognise or conceive personal or 
sectional interests within them.52 The approach followed in this book is not, therefore, 
unsympathetic to arguments that political explanation must take account of the 
                                                          
50 Compare Berman (2001), 241: ‘the growing insistence that motivations, interests and preferences be 
analyzed and problematized rather than assumed or posited is one of the most important contributions 
that ideational scholarship has made.’ 
51 Cf. Godelier (1982), 16–17, 20–1, 32–8, on the necessary ‘ideal’ element in social relations; Berman 
(2001), 237–41, on the complex questions which must be tackled in studying ‘institutionalisation’ of 
ideas. 
52 Habermas (1987), 95–6; (1990a), 67–8, 199–200; cf. Welch (1993), 112–13.  
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influence of both institutions and ideas on individuals’ political action.53 It clashes 
only with the more reductionist assumption that all human agents have predictable 
egoistic motivations, whose interactions with a given set of institutions can be quite 
straightforwardly mapped. 
 
To take a concrete example, Polemaios, standing before the Roman Senate, was 
guided in his political action and speech by a wide range of interconnected factors: his 
own idiosyncratic preferences, fears and impulses on the day in question; his 
awareness of his class interest as a member of the landowning, credit-giving elite of 
Asia Minor, with a material interest in Roman support; but also the particular political 
attitudes and beliefs, such as patriotic pride in his own particular, small-scale polis, 
and its territory, traditions and autonomy, which he had assimilated from the political 
cultures to which he had been exposed.  
 
It is also assumed in this book that there is a symmetrical indirect causal process in 
the other direction between political action, including the creation and running of 
institutions, and political culture.54 By acting politically, proposing or using 
institutions or observing the political actions of others, individuals can come to 
understand better the political conceptions, paradigms and norms influential on them, 
or recognise new connections or contradictions between them. For example, the 
particular act of voting may lead citizens to recognise the ambiguous meaning of the 
vote, noted above. Similarly, the ways of thinking and behaving which individuals 
develop, or come to understand, through participation in institutions55 provide a rich 
source of new ideas. If new ideas, inferences or associations resulting from action or 
                                                          
53 See, for example, Lieberman (2002) and Schmidt (2008), arguing for ‘discursive institutionalism’. 
54 Cf. Taylor (1985), 33–4. 
55 Compare Lieberman (2002), 700. 
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the functioning of institutions are confirmed and disseminated through political 
communication,56 they themselves become part of the political culture affected. 
 
4.3. Studying political culture through interpretation 
If political culture is defined in the way outlined here, the problem arises of how any 
political culture can be studied with any rigour.57 Since even survey interviews do not 
provide direct access, political culture can be effectively studied only through 
interpretation: political speech, organisation and action by members of a group should 
be interpreted as evidence for underlying shared conceptions, paradigms and norms, 
and tensions and ambiguities within or between them.58 The aim is to find the best 
possible explanation, at the level of political culture and habituation, for the attested 
explicit rhetoric and action. This method is not far removed from that adopted by 
Socrates and his interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues: the probing of common political 
and ethical statements, and associated practices, in order to discover the fundamental 
political and ethical paradigms or tensions presupposed or encouraged by them. 
 
It is legitimate to interpret almost all political speech and action in this way: according 
to the argument developed in this introduction so far, some of the fundamental 
political ideas which determine agents’ self-understanding and political horizons are 
necessarily at least implicit in much of their political action and speech, whether or 
not they have a firm or systematic grasp of them. A consequence of applying this 
approach is that underlying ideas are not fully articulated or represented in many of 
the pieces of evidence discussed. Indeed, very often, those pieces of evidence testify 
                                                          
56 For an interpretation of such processes, see Schmidt (2008), especially pp. 309–314. 
57 For methodological defences of the use of the concept of political culture in historiography: Welch 
(1993), 147–58; Formisano (2001), esp. 426.  
58 Cf. Taylor (1985), 31–2. On the distinction between this ‘interpretive’ approach and ‘behaviouralist’ 
approaches to studying political culture: Welch (1993), 2–6. 
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only to Greek citizens acting upon basic paradigms and norms simply by thinking, 
speaking, organising and behaving in accordance with their requirements, without 
closely inspecting their own assumptions and motivations. For example, by voting to 
use public funds to support theatrical contests and subsequently attending them, Greek 
citizens presupposed and implied that cultural activities represented an important 
element of civic life, as well as actively making that the case. On the other hand, 
many members of the Athenian audience at any particular Great Dionysia, for 
example, would never have consciously reflected deeply about the relative importance 
of military, political and cultural activities in civic life, even though their own 
attendance was partly inspired by underlying Athenian ideals emphasising the 
intertwining of culture and politics.59   
 
In the face of this difficulty, it is the careful interpretation of a very wide range of 
contrasting evidence which creates the best chance of uncovering underlying political 
cultures. It is necessary to study together pieces of evidence drawn from quite 
different contexts, and of quite different levels of theoretical sophistication. This 
involves trying to identify the shared presuppositions and ambiguities of these 
contrasting pieces of evidence, through comparison of more explicit and more 
implicit, and more theoretical and more practical, expressions of basic political 
ideas.60  
 
It is partly this method of studying political culture which drives a central aim of this 
book: in the ancient Greek case, this approach demands an attempt to integrate better 
inscriptions and literary texts as evidence for Greek political assumptions and ideals. 
                                                          
59 See, for example, Goldhill (1987), (2000), with earlier bibliography. 
60 Compare Rosanvallon (2006), esp. 64. 
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The value of integrating the epigraphic evidence is partly due to the fact that most 
inscribed decrees of Greek cities necessarily rested upon widely shared Greek ethical 
and political assumptions, because they had to be accepted by large and 
heterogeneous civic assemblies. Indeed, many inscribed civic decrees give a 
particularly direct insight into the processes by which diverse Greeks contributed to 
the painstaking, mammoth collective task of creating, sustaining and adapting a civic 
political culture. 
 
In addition, the comparison of epigraphic with literary texts makes widely shared 
assumptions and ambiguities stand out: overlaps between texts of contrasting kinds 
strongly suggest the influence of underlying political culture. Each type of evidence 
also gives insights into the other. Inscriptions often give a sense of the wider 
conceptual context within which intellectuals made their theoretical interventions, 
including some of its tensions and ambiguities.61 In the other direction, some Greek 
philosophers’ arguments and disagreements crystallise tensions within wider Greek 
ethical and political thinking. This throws into much sharper relief the distinctive 
aspects of particular pieces of inscribed rhetoric, or the submerged fault lines which 
cut through an apparently bland assemblage of civic virtues in an honorary decree. 
For this period, in particular, it is fortunate that Aristotle self-consciously set out to 
capture in sharper form widespread ethical and political assumptions. The result is 
that Aristotle’s analyses of, for example, different approaches to friendship or political 
theorising, and also his own equivocation between those approaches (see chapter 1), 
make it much easier to discern patterns, ambiguities and tensions in non-philosophical 
Greek rhetoric. 
                                                          





Interpretation of varied Greek political texts as evidence for underlying political 
cultures cannot yield indisputable answers: the resulting picture of political culture 
will inevitably be open to further debate. Nevertheless, great care can be taken to tie 
an interpretation very closely to the evidence. A specific danger with the method is 
that, whatever attested political speech or action is the object of interpretation, the 
interpreter can easily import the ideas of his own society.62 In order to minimise this 
risk of anachronism, it is important that any reconstructed political conception, 
paradigm or norm should be amenable to being described using language and 
concepts attested for the society concerned.  
 
Nevertheless, it is legitimate and often even necessary to use alien terminology to 
classify and analyse reconstructed political ideas, especially those which remain 
mainly latent or unconscious in a given society. In the Greek case, as will be argued in 
chapter 1 and subsequent chapters, common items of Greek political vocabulary often 
had very varied meanings. Moreover, the Greeks had not always already developed 
words to describe important political ideas: as Brock has recently emphasised, Greek 
thinkers and politicians could use political imagery and metaphor to ‘illuminate 
thoughts which (were) not yet explicitly formulated’.63 The result is that it could be 
misleading or limiting to use principally individual words to map Greek political 
culture. The character of Greek political culture can best be captured by identifying, 
with convenient modern or invented terminology, the basic political ideas evident in 
                                                          
62 Welch (1993), 98, 105–106. 
63 Brock (2013), xi. 
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whole pieces of rhetoric, institutions or actions, between which individual Greek 
terms could be ambiguous.64 
 
Despite these complications, the application of this approach to explicit Greek 
political language is the most straightforward one, which gives the most direct 
insights into the fundamental assumptions which an individual either himself held or 
expected his audience to hold. It is much more difficult to accurately identify the basic 
political ideas which guided Greek citizens’ decisions about institutions and actions 
on the sole evidence of results of those decisions: there are great difficulties in putting 
into practice the method advocated by Taylor, the identification of the ‘view of the 
agent and his relations to others’ which is ‘implicit in social practices’.65 These 
difficulties arise from the fact that it was perfectly possible for a Greek citizen to 
behave in a way which can be analysed in certain terms while being guided by a quite 
different understanding of his action. For example, it has recently been forcefully 
argued that participation in Greek political meetings and religious festivals provided 
excellent means for individuals to develop useful and lucrative networks of 
acquaintances.66 This does not, however, mean that relevant individuals were self-
consciously economically rational. The argument could be true even if most Greeks 
took part in such gatherings exclusively because they were committed to ideals of 
civic participation and piety. 
 
                                                          
64 Compare Cairns (2008), esp. 49–50, on the plurality of ‘scripts’ underlying most terms for emotions 
in ancient Greek (and other languages). Even strong advocates of the importance of studying closely 
the meanings of individual political words often also stress the need to take account of ways of thinking 
and underlying assumptions, for which societies sometimes take considerable time to find an 
appropriate vocabulary (see Skinner (2002), 159–60; compare Arena (2012), 31, 33). 
65 Taylor (1985), 35. 
66 On this function of Athenian political meetings, see recently Ober (2008). 
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As a result of this problem, particular care is taken in this book to justify claims that 
certain decisions about political institutions and actions are sufficient evidence for the 
influence of particular ways of understanding politics. At least one of two conditions 
must be met. First, it is necessary to ask whether it would have made sense to citizens 
to make particular decisions unless they were guided by relevant political ideas. If this 
question must be answered negatively, that gives strong grounds for believing that 
those ideas were influential. Alternatively, it is possible to ask whether significant 
links can be shown between the types of political assumption reconstructed as 
underlying particular political decisions, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
explicit political principles advocated in other contexts by the agents concerned, or by 
others exposed to the same political cultures. If such links can be identified, and if the 
relevant assumptions seem to provide the best explanation for the motivations and 
decision-making of the agents for whom explicit statements of principles are lacking, 
that also provides strong grounds for believing that those assumptions were 
influential. 
 
5. Exile and exiles as a key to understanding the political cultures of Greek poleis 
As suggested at the start, later-Classical and Hellenistic rhetoric, action and 
institutions related to the context of exile provide crucial insights into the political 
cultures of the Greek civic world as a whole, and also of particular poleis. It is 
important to bear in mind these two levels of Greek civic political culture, and their 
interconnections. Certain basic conceptions, paradigms and norms were widely 
dispersed around the Greek civic world: they made up a single, highly generic Greek 
civic political culture. Individual poleis’ political cultures drew on, and fed into, this 
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wider civic political culture, not least through exile and migration themselves, but 
often gave widespread ideas more specific, local forms. 
 
Exile is a particularly good tool for investigating these different levels of Greek 
political culture because it necessarily brought to the fore fundamental questions 
about politics: criteria of political exclusion and inclusion; the legitimacy of different 
forms of political organisation and behaviour; and even the nature of political utopia 
and dystopia. These issues could be brought into focus when, as in the two examples 
with which this introduction began, Greeks reflected on particular exiles’ ethical 
qualities. 
 
However, there were also many other ways, examined in the successive chapters of 
this book, in which exile catalysed fundamental reflection about politics or exposed 
basic assumptions, ambiguities and contradictions. Chapters 1–3 examine static 
products of political interaction: texts and institutions, of types widely attested for 
different poleis, in which ideas and practices relating to citizenship were crystallised. 
Chapters 1 and 2 address texts regulating and discussing the reintegration of exiles 
into poleis. Chapter 3 turns to the process inverse to reintegration, examining texts 
regulating or discussing the criteria for the lawful expulsion or disenfranchisement of 
citizens. 
 
In these three chapters, the texts and the institutions those texts establish or advocate 
illuminate relevant political cultures. In producing relevant epigraphic texts, citizens 
were obliged to define through dialogue criteria for the exclusion and inclusion of 
citizens, capable of commanding wide-ranging consensus. In doing so, they 
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necessarily made explicit shared fundamental assumptions and equivocations about 
the nature of the good polis and the good citizen, and their opposites, as a well as 
applying and developing those assumptions in revealing ways. These chapters’ 
subject matter also lends itself to productive juxtaposition of relevant inscriptions 
with discussions of the general problems by intellectuals and philosophers, for the 
sake of exposing common underlying political cultures.  
 
While chapters 1–3 examine static products of political interaction, chapters 4–6 
examine dynamic political interactions, treating them as further evidence for the shape 
of civic political cultures. Chapter 4 examines the rhetoric and behaviour of citizens in 
times of civic peace, showing the workings in practice of the paradigms identified in 
chapters 1–3. A connection is made with the main theme of exile through analysis of 
the rhetoric of participants in Athenian legal cases in which the exile of one of the 
participants was a looming possibility. Chapter 5 analyses the political language and 
behaviour of factionaries in civil wars leading to expulsions of citizens. Turning to a 
different type of political interaction, chapter 6 considers the political identities and 
organisation of exiles, predominantly groups of fellow exiles from one place or 
several places. It examines exiles expelled through a wide range of processes, 
including both members of factions expelled through stasis and whole civic 
populations expelled in interstate war. 
 
The types of rhetoric and action selected for examination in these last three chapters 
are particularly revealing of citizens’ fundamental political assumptions, and the 
different ways in which they applied them. Making a speech advocating or opposing 
calls for the expulsion of a citizen, of the kind considered in chapter 4, forced an 
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orator to appeal to basic criteria of inclusion or exclusion. Similarly, bouts of stasis 
leading to exile, examined in chapter 5, were periods of existential crisis for many 
poleis, which forced citizens to fall back on, but also to examine, their basic 
assumptions about politics, especially their assumptions regarding political 
membership, entitlement and virtue. As for chapter 6, the political identities and 
organisation of Greek exiles provide a unique laboratory of political habits, 
assumptions and ideals. In developing ab initio their own political relationships and 
institutions in exile, exiled citizens, especially when gathered in groups, were forced 
to make the most basic choices about citizen identity and citizen organisation, which 
they never faced directly within the established political systems of their home cities.  
 
In addition to revealing underlying political assumptions, analysis of the political 
speech and action addressed in these three chapters also makes it possible to consider 
the ways in which the indeterminacies and contradictions of Greek civic political 
culture enabled and encouraged individual agency. These chapters argue that orators 
in the courts, rivals in staseis leading to exile and groups of exiles adapting to 
different habitats in exile were able to exercise agency in appropriating, interpreting 
or modifying established basic political norms in very varied ways. 
 
The forms of political interaction considered in these chapters also illustrate the 
influence of exile on civic political cultures. The attested speech and behaviour of 
some exiles, considered in chapter 6, indicates ways in which their experience of exile 
shaped their political consciousness. In some cases, such modifications of perspective 
were disseminated into wider Greek civic political culture, with significant 




6. Recent debates about the political cultures of the later-Classical and Hellenistic 
polis, and this book’s response to them 
This section places the book in the context of existing scholarship concerning the 
political cultures of later-Classical and Hellenistic poleis. The dominant tendency in 
scholarship concerning Greek political cultures and civic life in these periods has been 
to emphasise the influence of one particular basic political paradigm: a paradigm of 
the good polis as a community of participatory, virtuous citizens, united in solidarity 
and political friendship through civic education, shared civic ideals and collective 
civic practices and laws. 
 
According to this paradigm, civic education in a wide variety of forms, including both 
legally regulated and more informal ones, is one of the most crucial means of 
maintaining citizens’ characters and civic harmony. This paradigm requires that the 
good citizen should, as made forcefully explicit in the decree of the Delphic 
Amphictyony considered at the start, devote himself to the welfare of his polis and its 
institutions and culture. 
 
This kind of basic understanding of the nature of a good polis and a good citizen has 
been widely recognised as underpinning much of Aristotle’s political and ethical 
philosophy,67 which was, as mentioned in section 4.3, partly an attempt to capture 
common fourth-century assumptions. Many scholars have emphasised Aristotle’s 
insistence that the end (τέλος) of a complete, true polis is realised when its citizens 
                                                          
67 Cf. Barnes (1990); Cooper (1999), chs. 6, 9–10; (2000); Rowe and Schofield (2000), chs. 15–18, e.g. 
316–17; Kraut (2002); Irwin (2007), 208–32. The main evidence for this interpretation of Aristotle’s 




all choose,68 within the framework of civic law, to satisfy standards of civic virtue (or 
‘living well’) inculcated in them through civic education.69 Indeed, Cooper has 
recently argued that Aristotle intended to suggest that an individual can understand 
and act on full human virtue only through political interaction with fellow citizens 
who also aspire to it.70 In any legitimate constitution, including that of Aristotle’s 
ideal polis, citizens exercise magistracies in ways conducive to the common good, 
rather than in ways which further their narrow personal or sectional interests.71  
 
Although Aristotle’s emphasis on civic virtue and community is often regarded as a 
reaction against prevailing Athenian democratic norms encouraging individual 
freedom,72 many scholars have emphasised the prevalence of norms of solidarity and 
civic virtue in Athenian democratic political culture itself.73 The Athenian ideal of 
democratic citizenship has been interpreted as requiring of the good citizen 
substantial, enthusiastic engagement in the Athenian civic community, if necessary at 
the expense of narrow personal interests.74 This expectation has been seen to guide a 
range of specific aspects of Athenian democratic civic life: for example, economic 
and financial relations between citizens, such as those involved in money-lending;75 
the shape of religious and dramatic festivals;76 attitudes concerning public speaking;77 
                                                          
68 Nussbaum (1980), esp. 422–3. 
69 E.g. Kraut (1989), 90–104; (2002), esp. chs. 6–7; Depew (2009), esp. 401–408. Note especially 
Aristotle Politics 1278b21–3; 1280a25–1281a8; 1263b36–7; also Nicomachean Ethics 1099b29–32.  
70 Cooper (2010), 228–48; cf. Cooper (1999), ch. 15. 
71 See, for example, Aristotle Politics 1279a25–31. 
72 E.g. Schofield (2000), 317; compare Christ (2012), 50, 61–7, on the community-oriented ideas of 
other intellectuals at Athens. 
73 For the overlaps between utopian political philosophy and mainstream political debate in the fourth-
century: Bertrand (1999); Loraux (2001); (2005); Holmes (2005), 12-15. 
74 For example, with varying emphases: Humphreys (1978), 239-40; Loraux (1981); Ober (1989), 68, 
72, 81, 262-3; Loraux (2001); (2005), 39–40; Wolpert (2002), 78–9; Farenga (2006), 536–7; Herman 
(2006). 
75 Millett (1991). 
76 Seaford (1994), chs. 7 and 10; Parker (2005). 
77 See recently Saxonhouse (2006). 
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approaches to dispute-resolution and the courts;78 and widespread concern with 
individuals’ character and education as guides to their suitability as citizens or 
political leaders.79  
 
Other scholars have argued for the prominence of civic unity and solidarity as 
components of the Classical Greek civic ideal more generally.80 For example, the 
common Greek metaphor of the polis as a body which is put under severe strain in 
stasis presupposes that a good polis should have an organic unity.81 Studies of more 
theoretical Greek political language have emphasised many Classical Greeks’ high 
evaluation of forms of ‘positive’ and ‘republican’ liberty: liberty as self-mastery; 
liberty as the state of being liberally educated and capable of social interaction 
through reason, not force; and liberty as the freedom to participate in civic 
government.82 Others have shown similar patterns in Classical Greek evaluations of 
emotions. An important case is Classical Greeks’ frequently high evaluation of 
‘shame’ (αἰδώς). That emotion was commonly conceptualised as a form of concern 
for others’ opinion which reinforced, rather than clashing with, respect for 
demanding, non-negotiable ethical standards, because it compelled self-restraint and 
civic commitment.83 
 
These aspects of the Classical Greek civic ideal of unity and fraternity have been 
shown to have found very varied expression in widespread institutions and practices: 
                                                          
78 Herman (2006). 
79 This last tendency may have become more pronounced in the mid-fourth century: Allen (2006); 
compare Azoulay (2006b). 
80 E.g. Veyne (1982), 884–888; Murray (1990c), esp. 21–3; Bertrand (1992), 76–7, 194; Ludwig 
(2002), 339–40. On special concern with solidarity in Spartan political culture (principally with 
reference to the Archaic period): Nafissi (2009), 130–1. 
81 Cf. Brock (2000), (2013), 74–6; Kosak (2000), 45–51. 
82 E.g. Cartledge (2000), 16–20; cf. Laks (2007) on Plato’s Laws. 
83 Cairns (1993), esp. 235–7, 354–60 (discussing in particular Plato Protagoras 322b6–323a4); 
Williams (1993).  
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rituals of civic commensality, which helped to represent a polis as like a household or 
family;84 collective involvement in, and commemoration of, war;85 the development 
of imagined relations of ‘kinship’ through common descent86 or real relations of 
friendship or erotic love between citizens;87 the development of collective traditions 
about local history and origins;88 or the stirring and transformative use of political 
language and rhetoric.89 
 
Studies of the political cultures of poleis after the conquests of Alexander the Great 
also tend to emphasise features which can be seen to be inspired by underlying 
commitment to principles of civic solidarity and unity. Many such studies, in which 
the poleis of Asia Minor tend to figure prominently, stress the expectations of civic 
virtue, public-spiritedness and participation on the part of civic elites reflected in the 
phenomenon of civic euergetism, in the ascendant in the Hellenistic polis, and the 
associated prominence of honorific decrees and portraits.90 Some also emphasise other 
aspects of the civic life of Hellenistic poleis which also reflected and reinforced 
underlying ideals of solidarity: the holding of civic festivals, including festivals 
celebrating civic unity or the city itself;91 the expectation that family life and 
reproduction would serve the interests of the city, reflected in marriage practices;92 the 
employment of public doctors;93 the publicly administered, ethical and cultural 
education of young citizens, especially in the gymnasium, designed to socialise them 
                                                          
84 Schmitt-Pantel (1992). 
85 Cf. Raaflaub and Wallace (2007), 35 (on the hoplite phalanx in the Archaic period). 
86 E.g. Loraux (1981); Lape (2010). 
87 Schofield (1999b), 35–46; Loraux (2001), ch. 8; Ludwig (2002).  
88 See, for example, Clarke (2008); or the papers collected in Foxhall, Gehrke and Luraghi (2010).  
89 Bertrand (1992); (1999), 49–50, 396–400. 
90 E.g. Veyne (1976); Gauthier (1985); Fröhlich (2005), 239, 255–6; Ma (2013), esp. chs. 1–2. On the 
corresponding interest in ‘generosity’ in Hellenistic political philosophy: Laks and Schofield (1995). 
91 Thériault (1996); Chaniotis (1995); Chankowski (2005). 
92 van Bremen (1996); (2003). 
93 Davies (1984), 307–8; Massar (2005). 
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into civic life and to make them identify with their city;94 rigorous programmes of 
military training for young citizens and schemes of military duties for older citizens;95 
and the corporate solidarity and virtue-oriented rhetoric of Hellenistic poleis in 
communication with kings.96 
 
In opposition to this dominant interpretation, which stresses Greek emphasis on civic 
solidarity, other scholars argue that later-Classical and Hellenistic civic political 
cultures and political philosophy gave much greater importance to individualism and 
to competition between citizens.97 The influence of Horden and Purcell (2000), with 
its emphasis on interconnections between poleis and personal mobility, has been a 
significant recent bolster to such views. For example, Vlassopoulos, inspired by 
Horden and Purcell, has argued that the diversity and variability of civic populations 
was reflected in prominent Greek conceptions of good social and political 
communities, which gave such communities more fluid boundaries and a greater level 
of internal diversity than characteristic of a closed, inward-looking, solidaristic 
polis.98 
 
Scholars have long emphasised Greek expectations, institutions and ways of thinking 
which can be seen to be inspired by one particular basic political paradigm with 
individualistic colouring: a paradigm of the good polis as an efficient, fair association 
of mainly self-interested, competitive citizens. Such an association is regulated by 
laws and procedures of a quite minimalist type, entirely different from those 
                                                          
94 See, for example, Gauthier (1995); Gehrke (2004); Kennell (2013). 
95 Ma (2000); Chaniotis (2005), especially 20–6. 
96 Ma (2002a). 
97 Cf. Long (R.T.) (2007). On the polarisation of modern scholarly interpretations of Greek political 
culture emphasising solidarity and individualism respectively: Loraux (1981), 4–7; Murray (1990c), 2–
3. 
98 Vlassopoulos (2007a), esp. chs. 2–3. 
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characteristic of the community-oriented paradigm: laws and procedures whose 
principal roles are to resolve disputes, maintain basic order and identify overlaps 
between the contrasting interests of different citizens. 
 
Such an association is also regulated by principles of tit-for-tat reciprocity. Those 
principles have a particular influence on the granting of civic rewards and incentives. 
Under tit-for-tat reciprocity, benefits and slights are returned in kind, in a context 
which allows the return to be seen as a direct response to the earlier good or bad turn 
or even as a repayment of a symbolic ‘loan’,99 even if not very close to it in time.100 
As a result, when tit-for-tat reciprocity dominates, individuals give benefits to others 
in the expectation of a direct return at some stage. 
 
It is very important to be clear that relations of tit-for-tat reciprocity are fundamentally 
different from other social relations which can also be described as reciprocal. Under 
an alternative, more ‘generalised’ regime of reciprocity, a citizen might aid another 
citizen or his polis for a less focussed reason: because he hopes to be in a position to 
call on the general good-will of the recipient, or of observers of his generosity, if he 
should find himself in need in some indefinite context at some indefinite future 
time.101 
 
Indeed, a sociological observer might argue that the forms of civic benevolence 
treated here as intrinsic requirements of the other, more community-oriented paradigm 
                                                          
99 Cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1162b31–3. 
100 For the possibility of tit-for-tat reciprocity, in accordance with an agreement (ὁμολογία), with a 
‘friendly’ delay, see Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1162b25–9. 
101 Compare Sahlins’ distinction between ‘balanced’ and ‘generalised’ reciprocity, critically discussed 
in van Wees (1998), 22–3. The objection to this distinction raised by van Wees is that a precisely 
calculated exchange does not involve the performance of generosity intrinsic to reciprocity on his 
definition (see pp. 18–19), but this book adopts a much broader conception of reciprocity.    
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are, in fact, usually moves in a more extended and nebulous reciprocal process guided 
by such hopes.102 This point is worth exploring, because it bears on a crucial objection 
to my approach: the objection that the polis-as-association paradigm being introduced 
here is not really so different from the previous polis-as-community paradigm. Can 
we not easily reconcile the two paradigms as different applications of vague basic 
ideas of reciprocity and two-sidedness? The problem with such an objection is that 
there is limited evidence for Greek political orators and philosophers explicitly 
accepting the alternative, more nebulous form of reciprocity identified above, still 
involving strategic pursuit of self-interest, as a positive ethical approach. It is true that 
that alternative form might offer a valid sociological analysis of some Greek civic 
benevolence apparently inspired by commitment to community. Nonetheless, Greek 
political orators and philosophers do not seem to have understood community and 
solidarity principally in that way. In so far as any Greek political orators and 
philosophers did explicitly embrace forms of strategic reciprocity, they tended to 
concentrate on tit-for-tat relations involving clearly identifiable, proportionate 
obligations of gratitude (χάρις) between benefactors and beneficiaries.103 
 
Probably the closest thing to explicit endorsement of a more nebulous form of 
strategic reciprocity in attested Greek political oratory and philosophy is the argument 
that it is worth contributing to the prosperity of one’s polis, because one may need to 
rely on one’s polis as a safety-blanket at some indefinite future time of personal 
crisis.104 However, that argument does not appeal directly to the instrumental material 
benefits accruing from good reputation and good social relations, only to those 
                                                          
102 Compare the interpretation of Athenian credit relations in Millett (1991); see also van Wees (1998), 
19. 
103 For more on these points, see the discussion of Demosthenes Against Leptines in chapter 3.4 below. 
104 Consider Pericles at Thucydides 2.60.2–3, discussed in chapter 5.4.2. 
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deriving from an impersonal collective store of resources, to whose size all citizens 
can contribute.  
 
To say that alternative forms of strategic reciprocity, lacking clearly identifiable, 
precise relations of χάρις, are not strongly endorsed in Greek political oratory and 
philosophy is not to deny that many Greek advocates of more community-oriented 
values, including Aristotle himself in relevant parts of his work, did regard 
benefactions to the polis as personally beneficial for the benefactor. It is simply to 
insist that what most such Greeks regarded as most personally valuable was the 
intrinsic quality of the social relations and lifestyle involved in engaged civic service, 
appreciated only by individuals with roots in their civic communities and an elevated, 
community-oriented understanding of personal well-being. They set much greater 
store by that than by the contingent accompanying gains in material goods and useful 
esteem, potentially appreciated by anyone. According to this way of thinking, there is 
no question of the good benefactor being directly and principally motivated by the 
prospect of narrow personal gain, in wealth or honour, even if it should happen to 
accrue to him through his actions. Rather, the focus of the good benefactor’s 
motivations is civic commitment and engagement with his fellow citizens, through 
which he knows that his self will be changed, and then benefited in its changed form. 
Indeed, he will become enmeshed with his community to a degree which makes it 
pointless to think strategically about future benefits for himself in isolation.  
 
A similar case can be made about the overlap between Greek language about civic 
benefaction and a still more indefinite and nebulous form of ‘generalised reciprocity’: 
the ‘golden-rule’ form, under which an individual acts benevolently because he 
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wishes to contribute to maintaining or creating a generalised expectation throughout 
his society that all should behave in a similarly benevolent way, without any 
expectation of a certain return, when circumstances make it necessary. There is little 
sign of Greek political orators and philosophers advocating the strategic pursuit of 
personal advantage through this type of ‘generalised reciprocity’. By contrast, there is 
good evidence for Greeks recognising the potential of this type of ‘generalised 
reciprocity’ to reinforce civic community. For example, Greek citizens commonly 
praised a particular benefactor, in a speech or honorary decree, for being an 
exemplary model for others. The stress in such cases lay on the considerations 
emphasised in my account of the polis-as-community paradigm in this section: self-
restraint, education of others and a substantial notion of the common good.105 Indeed, 
in general, as this book will argue, there is little sign of a middle way in Greek 
concepts of civic generosity between two extremes, often combined within the 
political outlook of Greek citizens: on the one hand, stress on tit-for-tat requital, 
underpinned by a quite narrow conception of what enlightened pursuit of self-interest 
might involve; on the other, stress on self-sacrifice, civic commitment and 
exemplarity, which may well bring long-term, broadly conceived happiness to the 
benefactors involved. 
 
The overarching polis-as-association approach to civic virtue and ethics is evident in a 
strong form in the extract from Polybius considered at the start: Polybius there 
explicitly elevates good faith in respect for rules and contracts above direct concern 
for communal welfare, traditions and institutions. As far as fourth-century philosophy 
is concerned, Yack has reacted against dominant interpretations of Aristotle’s political 
                                                          
105 See, for example, I.Sestos 1 (c. 120 BC), ll. 70–72; I.Iasos 98 (first century BC), ll. 16–19. 
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philosophy as strongly concerned with political solidarity. In his view, the more 
pragmatic claims and proposals offered in some parts of the Ethics and Politics 
themselves constitute a normative theory of truly political interaction: Aristotle 
regarded regulated conflict and competition between citizens as a natural part of 
politics, at least in any polis inferior to the utopia sketched in Politics Books VII–
VIII.106 Ober has even defended the view that Aristotle at times treats a polis as a 
social contract, emphasising that Aristotle argues that individuals and households 
initially come together in a polis for their mutual advantage (‘for the sake of bare 
life’).107 
 
Other scholars have made similar criticisms of the dominant interpretation of 
Classical Athenian political culture as strongly community-oriented, identifying 
important elements in Athenian attitudes and practices more suited to a fair 
association of competitive citizens.108 Some have emphasised fundamental norms 
guaranteeing individual freedom and security, especially in the economic sphere: 
norms giving priority to individuals’ property rights and personal liberty from slavery 
or imprisonment;109 or norms granting special importance to everyday formal and 
informal voluntary agreements between citizens (and between citizens and 
outsiders).110 Others have emphasised Athenian democratic basic norms encouraging 
individuals to pursue their self-interest within regulated bounds; making hard 
bargaining for individual advantage a paradigm of legal and political speech; or 
promoting the enforcement of principles of tit-for-tat reciprocity and personal 
                                                          
106 Yack (1985); (1993). Compare Saxonhouse (1992), 203–204, who attributes to Aristotle the quite 
extreme view that ‘to have factions is to be a polis, so to speak’. 
107 Ober (1996), ch. 11. See Aristotle Politics 1252b27–30; compare Nicomachean Ethics 1160a8–14. 
108 For a recent extended version of this case, see Christ (2012). 
109 E.g. Kahrstedt (1934), 133–57, with Scafuro (1994a), 3.  
110 E.g. Cohen (1973); (2000), chs. 5–6; (2003). 
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desert.111 For example, scholars have drawn attention to Athenian democratic norms 
making grants of citizenship dependent on concrete financial or political 
contributions112 and to Athenian democratic norms of punishment and retribution 
making the attribution of personal just deserts the main function of civic legal 
institutions.113 Related to such approaches is Ober’s recent attempt to present the 
Classical democracy as a knowledge-aggregating ‘machine’, ‘fuelled by a variety of 
incentives’.114 
 
Such interpretations of Athenian democratic basic norms can be compared with 
scholarly attempts to characterise more widespread Classical Greek ideas of 
citizenship as grounded in a conception of the good polis as an efficient, fair 
association. For example, some scholars suggest that a dominant Classical Greek idea 
of a citizen-body was that of a body of shareholders,115 analogous to shareholders in a 
company. This interpretation of Greek ideas of citizenship can in turn be put in the 
context of a broader scholarly tendency to identify reciprocity and reciprocal 
exchange as cornerstones of Greek ethics.116 
 
A minor strand in scholarship concerning the Hellenistic polis makes norms 
appropriate to an efficient, fair civic association a determining influence on 
Hellenistic civic life. Bargaining and reciprocal exchange of favours have been 
                                                          
111 Contrast the view of Seaford (1994), esp. 191–206, 303–7, 388–405, that Classical Athenian 
political culture was marked by a rejection of socially disruptive principles of material reciprocity (the 
Homeric inheritance) in favour of ideals of civic solidarity.  
112 Davies (1977/8), 114–15, 118–20. 
113 Allen (2000), esp. 241. 
114 Ober (2008), 121. 
115 J.K. Davies, OCD s.v. ‘citizenship’; compare Todd (1993), 182; Brun (2000), 134; Christ (2006), 
ch. 1 (on Athens). 
116 Cf. most papers in Gill, Postlethwaite and Seaford (1998); Balot (2001), e.g. 5–6. 
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identified as the hallmark of relations between poleis and their benefactors117 and 
between poleis and their sanctuaries in Hellenistic Asia Minor.118 Moreover, scholars 
have analysed in similar terms Hellenistic federal states or koina, such as Polybius’ 
Achaian League, which incorporated many poleis and usually reproduced familiar 
civic institutions on a larger scale. For example, Mackil has recently presented the 
political life of such federal states as distinguished by bargaining, give-and-take and 
compromise between member states and the central federal authorities.119 Such 
accounts of Hellenistic civic and federal life can be set alongside accounts of mid- and 
later-Hellenistic Stoicism which identify the protection of property rights and other 
individual entitlements as a priority of Stoic political philosophy from the mid-
Hellenistic period onwards.120  
 
In addition to the paradigm of a good polis as an efficient, fair association, two other 
basic individualistic paradigms of citizenship have been presented as characteristic of 
the fourth-century Athenian democracy. First, D.J. Cohen (1995) argues that, in the 
fourth-century Athenian law-courts, dominant underlying civic norms encouraged 
competitive self-assertion by citizens, as heads of households. In his view, the 
relevant norms did not discourage even extremely aggressive, almost anarchic pursuit 
of personal and family feuds through civic institutions. Second, there has been an 
increasing tendency, partly motivated in some cases by a desire to differentiate Greek 
civic political thinking from communitarian or even totalitarian approaches,121 to 
assimilate the norms of fourth-century Athenian political culture to what can be called 
                                                          
117 E.g. Davies (1984), 307, 310–11. 
118 Dignas (2002). 
119 Mackil (2013), e.g. 346, 392–8. 
120 Long (1995); (1997). 
121 Note, in particular, anti-totalitarian interpretations of the Greek polis developed in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, such as Arendt (1958), e.g. 24–33, 205–207; Vernant (1962). 
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‘proto-Kantian’ assumptions: the basic, uncodified assumptions which have been 
developed into systematic philosophies in both Kantian moral philosophy and ensuing 
neo-Kantian moral and political philosophy. 
 
I am referring in particular to the basic ethical assumptions about the value of 
individuals as ends in themselves which are given formal shape in the ‘Humanity’ and 
‘Kingdom of Ends’ versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative: the imperative ‘so act 
that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’; and the requirement that 
‘a rational being must always regard himself as lawgiving in a kingdom of ends 
possible through freedom of the will, whether as a member or as sovereign’, that is, as 
a member of a potential community of fellow legislators who treat one another as 
moral ends in themselves and engage in rational deliberation about morality.122 I am 
also referring to the related basic political assumptions developed into systematic 
form in subsequent, more explicitly political and pluralist123 developments and 
adaptations of relevant aspects of Kant’s thought in neo-Kantian philosophies, notably 
those of Rawls and Habermas.124 According to such underlying assumptions, citizens 
should show unconditional equal respect, for its own sake, towards all individual 
fellow citizens and their aims in life. Showing such respect involves recognising that 
all fellow citizens are capable of formulating their own valid ethical and political 
ideas. This usually makes necessary recognition of the simultaneous validity of a wide 
                                                          
122 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4.429 and 434, in the translation of M. Gregor 
(Korsgaard and Gregor (1998)). 
123 For the view that there are significant pluralistic elements in Kant’s own philosophy, sometimes 
implicit, see Hill (2000). 
124 See especially Rawls (1972); Habermas (1996). Admittedly, both Rawls and Habermas diverge 
substantially from Kant, rejecting the transcendental foundations of his moral theory. However, 
similarities in basic approach are substantial: Kant’s ideal of a self-legislating ‘Kingdom of Ends’ can 
be seen as providing the basic structure even of Habermas’ Ideal Speech Situation, even though 
Habermas makes his ideal community of mutually respectful legislators more social or sociable, in 
accordance with Hegel’s criticisms of Kant, and more political, in accordance with Marxist thought. 
46 
 
range of divergent, often conflicting points of view. Significantly, according to this 
set of basic political assumptions, this recognition should not take the form merely of 
passive, detached acceptance: citizens must put it into practice through participation 
in extensive pluralistic dialogue and deliberation, in which they each attempt to 
understand one another and to find common ground. 
 
Few would claim that the ethical universalism of Kant and some of his successors 
finds many prominent precursors in Classical Athenian political culture, but several 
scholars have argued that the Athenians did strongly value relevant types of mutual 
respect in connection with a more limited range of human relationships, those among 
fellow citizens. One relevant recent example is Liddel (2007), a very thought-
provoking previous attempt to weld together the evidence of literary sources and 
inscriptions, in order to offer a broad account of Greek political thinking. Liddel 
recognises substantial differences between the good liberal society and the fourth-
century Athenian democratic ideal. However, he also identifies substantial overlaps 
between the two, especially between the basic conceptions of liberty and obligation 
prominent in each. According to him, in fourth-century Athenian political culture, 
individual liberty was predominantly interpreted as the liberty to participate in a 
political community, partly prefiguring Rawls’ good society, of mutually respectful, 
relatively equal citizens with reciprocal political obligations.125 
 
In a partly similar vein, Ober consciously draws on Rawls’ ideas126 in arguing that 
fundamental Classical Athenian civic norms gave very considerable weight to respect 
                                                          
125 For a similar interpretation of Athenian notions of the freedom of the citizen, this time expressed 
within a civic republican framework: Cartledge and Edge (2009). 
126 Cf. Rawls (1972); (2000). 
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for the dignity of individual citizens, including their right to free speech.127 Ober 
makes subtle and effective distinctions between different types of ‘dignitarian’ 
approach. For example, he has recently endorsed the view that a ‘fully moralized 
Kantian conception of human dignity as intrinsic worth without price’ is ‘distinctly 
modern’. This forms part of his argument that the ancient Athenians developed a more 
limited notion of ‘civic dignity’ as freedom from humiliation and infantilisation, 
mutually recognised only by fellow citizens of the same polis.128 
 
Ober’s discussion leaves two possibilities open. On the one hand, Athenian democrats 
may have believed that respect for another man’s dignity should be unconditional and 
for its own sake, provided that he cleared the hurdle of being a fellow citizen. On the 
other, they may have thought that such respect ought to be more deeply conditional on 
that other man’s conformity with shared aims or identity. Nevertheless, Ober 
explicitly presents as central to any form of dignity ‘having one’s claims recognised 
and respected by others’,129 presumably irrespective of the content of those claims, a 
point which favours the former interpretation of how his argument applies to Athens. 
Understood in that way, even Ober’s Athenian ‘civic dignitarianism’ can be 
characterised as proto-Kantian, to the extent that it too anticipates, in restricted form, 
Kantian concern with entirely unconditional respect for individuals as ends in 
themselves. This aspect of Ober’s work chimes with parts of Hansen’s picture of 
Athenian democratic political culture: without explicitly drawing attention to Kantian 
                                                          
127 Ober (1996), 101; (2003a), esp. 251–2. Compare Miller (2009). 
128 Ober (2012), quotation from p. 828. 
129 Ober (2012), 831; cf. 837, 842 on civic dignity in particular. 
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or neo-Kantian ideas and assumptions, Hansen has identified basic norms of tolerance 
as prominent within fourth-century Athenian political culture.130  
 
Such emphasis on Athenian tolerance is consistent with a wider recent tendency to 
view the Athenian democracy as an example of the modern ideal of deliberative 
democracy: a political system in which citizens participated in unconstrained 
dialogue, recognising the plurality of important ethical considerations and the 
possibility that they might be incommensurable. Some have even compared the 
deliberative practices of the Athenian democracy with those intrinsic to Habermas’ 
Ideal Speech Situation.131 The broad recent tendency to identify proto-Kantian 
elements in Athenian political culture has been mirrored in some recent approaches to 
Aristotle: some historians of philosophy have claimed that Aristotle attributed far 
more political and ethical importance than generally thought to unconditional respect 
for the dignity and rational preferences of individuals.132  
 
As is clear from this discussion, many scholars have presented the political cultures of 
individual poleis in this period as internally homogeneous.133 This is probably partly a 
result of a widespread belief in the rationality of Greek political cultures.134 
Nevertheless, there is a rival tendency in modern scholarship, which emphasises the 
coexistence of different paradigms of good citizenship within individual poleis’ 
political cultures. First, there has been a recent tendency in scholarship to claim that 
                                                          
130 See, for example, his comments in BMCRev 2006.01.32. For his more general liberal democratic 
conception of Athenian democracy: Hansen (1999), 73–85; (2006). 
131 For a critical discussion of such views, with bibliography: Schofield (2006), 55–8. 
132 For example, Miller (1995) even sees Aristotle as an advocate of a theory of ‘rights’. For an 
alternative way of seeing Aristotle as particularly keen to ensure respect for individuals’ rational beliefs 
and preferences, see Irwin (2007), 226–7. Such approaches are criticised as anachronistic in Schofield 
(1999a), ch. 8; Gill (1996), e.g. 24–5, 338–40; (2006), 365–6. 
133 For an explicit claim to this effect: Herman (2006), 100. Compare Cartledge (2009), 18.  
134 Cf. Murray (1990c). 
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Classical Athenian and wider Greek political culture, and the political philosophy 
produced within them, harmoniously united in new syntheses competing ideals of 
citizenship: in particular, ideals resembling those underpinning modern liberal, 
communitarian and sometimes also deliberative conceptions of democracy.135 Second, 
other scholars have argued that coexisting paradigms of citizenship were in tension 
with each other within individual poleis’ political cultures, making irreconcilable rival 
demands on citizens.136 The result could be ‘doublethink’137 or crisis, but also 
paradoxical flourishing.138  
 
This book uses the evidence of exile to evaluate these different interpretations of 
Greek political cultures in this period, and to offer its own interpretation. The 
conclusions are gradually unfolded in the following chapters, with detailed summaries 
in the concluding sections of individual chapters, but they can be partly foreshadowed 
here. 
 
The examination of the material relating to exile reveals much evidence for the 
underlying influence of some of the paradigms surveyed here, but little for others. 
There is strong evidence for the coexistence and influence of fairly radical forms of 
the two paradigms emphasised in this section, polis-as-community and polis-as-
                                                          
135 On the Classical Athenian democracy: Ober (1999), 372; (2005), 88–9 (criticising Loraux); 
Monoson (2000), 237 (‘reciprocal exchange’ and ‘unity’ both key to the democratic polis). On the 
Classical polis more generally: Gill (1996), 340–1 (arguing that norms encouraging cultivation of 
‘shared life’ and norms encouraging maintenance of reciprocal relations were ‘complementary’ in 
Greek ethics); (1998) (identifying harmony between altruism and reciprocity); Farenga (2006), 36. On 
political thought: Balot (2006), 14–15, 54–62; (2009b); (2009c); Salkever (2009b). 
136 For example, Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1973); Veyne (1976), e.g. 163; Davies (1977/8), esp. 114–
21; Ober (1989), e.g. 298–9; (1994), 103; Loraux (1993), 48; (2001), 245–64; Wilson (2000), e.g. 107–
108; Davidson (2001), 47; Morgan (2003b), x, xx; Moreno (2007); Ma (2008a), esp. 380–5. Compare 
arguments for the heterogeneity and internal contradictions of Greek culture in general: Veyne (1983), 
esp. 52–68; Dougherty and Kurke (2003). 
137 Moreno (2007), 268–9, 279. 
138 Cf. Ober (1989); Ma (2008a), 380–5. 
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association, but relatively little evidence for the pronounced, mainstream influence of 
the other individualistic paradigms mentioned in this section. It is not surprising that 
there should be little evidence of explicit theorising along Kantian or neo-Kantian 
lines in the ancient Greek evidence. It is, however, noteworthy that there is relatively 
little evidence in mainstream Greek political debate and interaction for the influence 
of underlying proto-Kantian assumptions favouring unconditional respect for 
individuals and pluralism, similar to those which were eventually to provide the raw 
material for Kant and his later followers to develop systematic philosophies. 
 
With the help of the exile evidence, this book offers a new interpretation of the 
precise character of the two dominant quite radical underlying paradigms, named as 
‘Nakonian’ and ‘Dikaiopolitan’, after poleis in which they are particularly clearly 
attested, in chapter 1. In that chapter and throughout, it reveals the importance of 
extreme features, indeterminacies, ambiguities and tensions within Greek civic 
political cultures oriented around these two paradigms. As part of this exercise, the 
book considers the character of the coexistence of the two paradigms. It is suggested 
that the two paradigms can be understood as the two contrasting parts of a dialectical 
pair: each paradigm gained definition and strength from the contrast with the other; 
and they sustained each other in existence. 
 
In addition, in chapters 4–6, a new interpretation is offered of the complex workings 
in practice of the dominant underlying paradigms, across the Greek world as a whole 
and in individual poleis’ political cultures. An argument emerges that the coexistence 
of the two paradigms could be conducive to civic stability, and even flourishing, when 
citizens engaged in the imaginative ‘doublethink’ necessary to ignore, tolerate, 
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negotiate or harness the contradictions and inconsistencies involved. This process did, 
however, have a devastating corollary: the dominant underlying paradigms, and their 
extremes, ambiguities and contradictions, often led, individually or in combination, to 
violent stasis, which often forced citizens into exile. This was especially true when 
external or internal pressures forced citizens to attempt to derive coherent, consistent 
principles, ideologies and plans of action from the complex, swirling resources of 
their political cultures. The contrasting ways of imagining the good polis thus had 
crucial practical roles in both civic peace and civic unrest, both stasis and stability. 
 
 
